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SYMPOSIUM

HOW WOULD THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS DECIDE HOLT V. HOBBS?
Francesca M. Genova*
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Holt v. Hobbs, which affirmed a prisoner’s
1
right under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to
2
grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his sincerely held Islamic faith. This
case involved weighing the prisoner’s religious interests against the compelling
3
governmental interest in prison security. The balancing-of-interests framework
rarely is found in American constitutional jurisprudence, which focuses on drawing
4
lines and creating categories. Instead, in the United States, this framework is largely
statutorily created. Meanwhile, “‘[p]roportionality’ is today accepted as a general
principle of law by constitutional courts and international tribunals across the
5
6
world[,]” such as the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).
Some, like Justice Stephen Breyer, have advocated for a wider use of
7
proportionality in the United States. The proportionality approach determines
whether a law is “helpful, necessary, and appropriate” in achieving its intended goal
© 2017 Francesca M. Genova. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Andrea Pin
and Laura Wolk for their helpful comments, as well as Professor Donald Kommers for inspiring
the Essay. Many thanks to the Notre Dame Law Review staff, who were meticulous in their editing.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
2 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).
3 Id. at 859.
4 Proportionality is used in the Eighth Amendment context. See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). Vicki Jackson argues that it is also part of strict scrutiny. See Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Law in the Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015).
5 Jackson, supra note 4, at 3096.
6 See Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere but Here?,
22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297–98 (2012) (discussing proportionality in the United States
and other jurisdictions).
7 See id.; Robert Barnes, Breyer on the Constitution, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/19/AR2010091904342.html.
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8

by considering other factors at stake in its application. Thus, the RLUIPA balancing
test provides a point of comparison between U.S. law and the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court contends with the possible application of
proportionality in future constitutional cases.
To that end, this Essay inquires: How would the ECtHR decide Holt v. Hobbs,
given the same evidence provided at the district court level and the reasoning of the
court of appeals? Analyzing this case through the ECtHR’s lens will elucidate the
implications of the proportionality test in American jurisprudence. To do so, Part I
will compare the two jurisdictions. Part II will summarize Holt v. Hobbs. Part III
will describe the ECtHR’s relevant recent free exercise jurisprudence. Part IV will
discuss how, based on this analysis, the ECtHR could decide Holt v. Hobbs in light
of its overarching principles. Finally, the conclusion will show how RLUIPA has
aligned the Supreme Court’s statutory free exercise jurisprudence with the ECtHR’s
and will detail some normative concerns that these analytical structures present.
I.

COMPARISON OF THE ECtHR AND THE SUPREME COURT

Both the ECtHR and the Supreme Court use balancing tests for certain
religious freedom issues, although there are some noteworthy differences between
them. Most importantly, the source of the religious right differs significantly. The
ECtHR’s religious rights protection is based in Article 9 of the European Convention
9
of Human Rights, which functions like a constitution, while the prisoner’s religious
rights asserted in Holt v. Hobbs are statutory: there is no constitutional requirement
10
for prisons to accommodate prisoners’ religious rights. These differences do not
foreclose analysis, however. Each court has looked to the other in certain contexts,
11
and they are guided by similar concerns.
A. The ECtHR’s General Interpretive Principles
1. Article 9 of the European Convention
The European Convention on Human Rights protects religious freedom under
Article 9, which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
12
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” While this right
is not unlimited, it is “subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the

8 Schlink, supra note 6, at 292.
9 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
10 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
12 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9, § 1. For an overview of the European Court of Human
Rights’s structure generally, see Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer
Jurisprudence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419 (2014).
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protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
13
freedoms of others.”
These limitations play a crucial role in the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence.
2. The Margin of Appreciation
Fundamental to the ECtHR’s analysis is the “margin of appreciation” doctrine.
Since there is “no specific or single model” of government mandated by the
European Convention on Human Rights, the “margin of appreciation” doctrine
allows the ECtHR to respect legitimate differences in conceiving, structuring, and
14
protecting conventional rights.
Under this doctrine, the ECtHR gives broad
deference to individual Member States of the Council of Europe, the organization
with which it is associated, when there is a lack of consensus among those states
about the application of a conventional right, and scrutinizes a Member State’s laws
15
more closely if its laws are out of line with European consensus.
This deference should provide Member States some freedom in approaching
issues of rights and governance unless a consensus has been formed. In the context
of Article 9 rights, however, it can be argued that this doctrine is being “erod[ed]”
by the ECtHR’s emphasis on neutrality in recent decisions, which narrows the range
16
of legitimate approaches to Article 9 rights. In the cases analyzed below, the
“margin of appreciation” plays a fairly significant role. No similar doctrine governs
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal statute.
B. The Supreme Court’s General Interpretive Principles on Freedom of Religion
Under the landmark decision Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme
Court held that “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest,” as they do not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
17
18
Clause.
It largely overruled the balancing test applied in prior cases, which
consisted of determining whether a law that substantially burdened religious
19
exercise was “necessary to further a compelling state interest,” on the premise that
20
this balancing test would allow a religious believer “to become a law unto himself.”
This decision led to Congress’s near-immediate, near-unanimous passing of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), signed into law by President Bill

13 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9, § 2.
14 Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human
Rights’ Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 627, 641 (2011); see also Genova, supra note 12, at 427.
15 Genova, supra note 12, at 427–28.
16 Id. at 424 n.29.
17 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
18 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963).
19 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
20 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
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Clinton. Its aim was to “provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” and
restore, and indeed provide greater protection than, the pre-Smith compelling interest
22
23
test. RLUIPA, enacted later, defined religious exercise to include “any exercise
24
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”
25
and applied to prisoners’ religious free exercise. RLUIPA provides, in relevant
part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates”
that the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the
26
least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.” RFRA and RLUIPA have
provided the Supreme Court with a balancing-of-interests framework, and RLUIPA
was the subject of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Holt v. Hobbs.
II.

HOLT V. HOBBS

A. Case Background and Summary
Arkansas inmate Gregory Holt was a devout Muslim who believed that his
27
faith prohibits cutting his beard. The grooming policy of the Arkansas prison in
which he was incarcerated prohibited facial hair, only exempting those with
28
dermatological problems who were permitted to wear a quarter-inch beard.
Although Holt believed that his religion mandates a full beard, he asked for
permission from the prison to grow a half-inch beard, which he felt was a
29
30
compromise.
The prison denied his request.
Holt then filed a complaint in
31
federal district court, claiming that the grooming policy violated RLUIPA.
At an evidentiary hearing, the Department of Corrections provided three
reasons for the beard policy: (1) to prevent concealment of contraband in facial hair,
(2) to hinder prisoners’ ability to change their physical appearance by shaving in
order to escape or enter restricted prison areas, and (3) to ensure proper monitoring

21 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religiouspractices.html?mcubz=1&pagewanted=print; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2012); Eugene
Volokh, 1A. What is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013,
7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restoration-act/. The law’s broad
support may be decreasing. See, e.g., Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the
Federal
‘Religious
Freedom’
Law,
WASH.
POST
(June
25,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedomrestoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html.
22 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
24 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
25 Id. § 2000cc-1.
26 Id. § 2000cc-1(a).
27 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
28 Id. at 859, 860.
29 Id. at 861.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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32

of facial hair. Each of those three reasons had countervailing weaknesses: the
Department’s witnesses named no instance where inmates concealed contraband in
facial hair and conceded that inmates could do so instead in the hair on their heads
or clothing; no witness explained why taking photos of inmates without a beard, the
solution adopted by other prisons, would not prevent identity-change issues; and the
prison already monitored the quarter-inch beards allowed for dermatological
33
purposes.
B. The Lower Courts’ Rulings
The district court ruled in favor of the prison on the grounds that the prison is
entitled to deference and reasoned that Holt could exercise his religion through
praying on a prayer rug, observing religious holidays, and maintaining his religious
34
diet. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed for substantially the
same reasons and ultimately concluded that the Department had shown that the
grooming policy was the “least restrictive means of furthering its compelling
35
security interests.”
C. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Department’s policy violated
RLUIPA, as it substantially burdened Holt’s undisputed sincerely held religious
beliefs and was not shown to be the least restrictive means of furthering that
36
interest.
1. The “Substantial Burden” Analysis
The Court easily held that the prison policy was a substantial burden on Holt’s
free exercise because the prisoner was required to choose between facing
37
disciplinary action or following his religious beliefs.
The Court asserted that the district court had erred in considering religious
practice and issues more broadly than is mandated by the substantial burden test.
First, the district court improperly considered the other opportunities that Holt had
38
to worship in holding that his religious exercise was not substantially burdened.
Second, the district court should not have considered that the burden to Holt’s
religious exercise was “slight” because “his religion would ‘credit’ him for
39
attempting to follow his religious beliefs.”
RLUIPA applies to all religious
40
exercise even if it is not a strict requirement of the faith. Third, the district court
should have ignored Holt’s testimony that “not all Muslims believe that men must
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862, 864, 865, 867.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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41

grow beards.” This belief “is by no means idiosyncratic. . . . But even if it were,
the protection of RLUIPA . . . is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
42
members of a religious sect.’”
An individual is substantially burdened when
required to choose between exercising his or her faith and obeying government
43
rules.
2. The “Compelling Governmental Interest” Test
Since Holt’s “sincere exercise of religion [was] being substantially
44
burdened,” the Supreme Court stressed that RLUIPA requires a “more focused”
compelling governmental interest—applying to Holt in particular—than the
45
“‘broadly formulated’” ones of prison safety and security. The Court recognized
that there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing prisoners from hiding
46
contraband and identifying prisoners easily.
3. The “Least Restrictive Means” Prong
The “least restrictive means” part of the Court’s analysis led it to rule that the
47
prison policy was unjustified.
The Court addressed the two compelling
governmental interests: (1) preventing the hiding of contraband and (2) identifying
prisoners easily.
First, the argument that a half-inch beard created a contraband concern was
48
“hard to take seriously.” Fairly obviously, the beard could hide only something
very small, and the prisoner “would have to find a way to prevent the item from
49
falling out.” Furthermore, since prisoners can have longer hair on their heads, “it
50
is hard to see why” they would opt to hide anything in their beards. Even accepting
this premise, however, there were less restrictive means available. The Department
already conducted searches of prisoners’ hair and clothing and permitted beards for
51
dermatological reasons. It failed to offer a compelling reason why these measures
52
were insufficient.
The Supreme Court also held that the prison’s identification interest could be
53
satisfied by the dual photo policy used by other prisons. And, the prison did not
detail why a half-inch beard was problematic when a quarter-inch beard, longer hair

41 Id.
42 Id. at 862–63 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–716 (1981)).
43 See id. at 862 (“If petitioner contravenes [the Department’s] policy and grows his beard,
he will face serious disciplinary action. Because the grooming policy puts petitioner to this choice,
it substantially burdens his religious exercise.”).
44 Id. at 863 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)).
45 Id. (quoting Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779).
46 Id. at 863, 864.
47 Id. at 863–65.
48 Id. at 863.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 864.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 865.
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on prisoners’ heads, and mustaches did not cause similar concerns. While prison
officials’ expertise should be respected, it was no substitute for “RLUIPA’s rigorous
standard. And without a degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning
acceptance, it [was] hard to swallow the argument” that the denial of the half-inch
55
beard furthered the Department’s interest. Thus, the Court reversed the Eighth
56
Circuit’s decision.
III.

ECtHR CASES ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE

The ECtHR’s religious freedom jurisprudence centers on Article 9 of the
European Convention. In its analysis of Article 9, the European Court uses a stepby-step proportionality framework, first determining whether there has been an
57
“interference” with or “limitation” of the applicant’s Article 9 rights, then
58
examining whether this interference was “prescribed by law” for a “legitimate
59
60
aim[]” as laid out in Article 9 and was “necessary in a democratic society” to
achieve that legitimate aim.
This Part will examine each of these steps in the European Court’s current
caselaw to explicate what this proportionality test means. The analysis will focus
61
62
on three cases: Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, Eweida v. United Kingdom, and S.A.S. v.
63
France. Each of these cases provides parallels to Holt v. Hobbs. Poltoratskiy v.
Ukraine concerns a prisoner who claimed that his Article 9 rights were violated
64
when he was unable to see a priest. Eweida v. United Kingdom focuses on two
65
women who wanted to wear external signs of their faith. S.A.S. v. France involves
66
France’s general prohibition of burqas and other full-face coverings. These cases
67
provide insight into how the European Court would rule on Holt v. Hobbs.

54 Id.
55 Id. at 864.
56 Id. at 867.
57 See, e.g., S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 110 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014) (quoting
Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8, 9).
58 Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9).
59 Id. ¶ 111.
60 Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8, 9).
61 App. No. 38812/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003).
62 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013).
63 App. No. 43835/11.
64 App. No. 38812/97 at ¶¶ 163, 164.
65 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 at ¶ 3.
66 App. No. 43835/11 at ¶ 3.
67 The analysis will exclude other ECtHR cases concerning external manifestations of
religion and religious integration, as their value in the prison context would be limited to questions
of whether there are more complex cultural evaluations undergirding the ECtHR’s decisions. For
a discussion of whether the ECtHR’s decisions concerning Muslims show different treatment for
Islam than other faiths, see MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 88–97 (2007).
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A. Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine
68

Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine shows that prisoners are entitled to Article 9 rights,
although caselaw on this subject is limited. In that case, a prisoner on death row met
with a priest only once months after his parents sent the government a letter
requesting that he receive visits with a priest and was denied the ability to meet with
69
a priest at any other time. The ECtHR did not consider the guidelines preventing
priests’ visitation to be “law,” as they were internal, unpublished, and unavailable to
70
the public. The Court held that this situation interfered with the prisoner’s Article
71
9 rights.
B. Eweida v. United Kingdom
In Eweida v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR, in relevant part, considered the
applications of two women who claimed that their employers violated their Article
72
9 rights in prohibiting religious necklaces.
1. Facts and Procedural History
73

Nadia Eweida worked for British Airways, a private employer.
British
Airways’ uniform policy prohibited visible accessories unless they were
74
preapproved by local management. Although she previously had concealed her
75
cross necklace, Eweida decided to wear it openly. Her manager told her that she
would be sent home unpaid for refusing to comply, so she reluctantly followed the
76
policy. Later, she decided to display the cross again and was sent home without
77
pay. British Airways eventually offered her an administrative position that did not
78
require a uniform as an accommodation, but she rejected it. British Airways, after
receiving negative publicity, amended its policy to allow visible religious symbols,
79
but it did not compensate her for her lost earnings. Eweida filed a claim with the
80
Employment Tribunal, citing British law and the European Convention.
All domestic courts ruled in favor of British Airways. First, the Employment
Tribunal rejected her claim because the “visible wearing of a cross was not a
mandatory requirement of the Christian faith but Ms[.] Eweida’s personal choice[,]”

68 Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, App. No. 38812/97, ¶ 167 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003). In the United
States, prisoners have limited constitutional rights. See Prisoners’ Rights, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https:// www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
69 Poltoratskiy, App. No. 38812/97 at ¶¶ 21, 33, 49, 75, 165–66.
70 Id. ¶ 158.
71 Id. ¶ 160.
72 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013).
73 Id. ¶ 9.
74 Id. ¶ 10.
75 Id. ¶ 12.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. ¶ 13.
80 Id. ¶ 14.
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and no evidence of a similar complaint existed in British Airways’ 30,000-person
81
workforce. The Court of Appeal agreed and held that the British Airways rule was
82
“a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”
It noted that British
Airways addressed the problem once it had been raised and in the interim offered
83
Eweida a position that would have had no public contact.
84
The second petitioner, Shirley Chaplin, worked as a nurse. She had worn a
cross necklace for more than thirty years and believed that removing it would violate
85
her faith. The hospital’s policy, based on the Department of Health’s guidance,
prohibited necklaces in hospitals because they create a “risk of injury,” but religious
86
accommodation requests could be made with the manager. When V-neck tunics
were introduced for nurses, she requested an accommodation to wear her cross with
87
them. The hospital denied her request because a patient could pull on the necklace
88
and cause harm. She then suggested wearing a necklace with a magnetic clasp that
89
would immediately open if pulled.
The hospital also rejected this suggestion,
reasoning that the cross could come into contact with open wounds after being
90
pulled.
It suggested instead that the cross be clipped to the lanyard she was
required to wear, which she needed to remove “when performing close clinical
91
92
duties.” Chaplin rejected this proposal.
She filed a complaint with the Employment Tribunal, which ruled in favor of
the hospital because the hospital’s position was “based on health and safety rather
93
than religious grounds.” Furthermore, it maintained that the hospital’s response to
94
her request was proportionate.
2. Was There an “Interference” with or “Limitation” on Religious Exercise
Rights?
95

The ECtHR recognized that both women’s Article 9 rights had been limited.
It acknowledged, however, that “if a person is able to take steps to circumvent a
limitation placed on his or her freedom to manifest religion or belief, there is no
96
interference with the right under Article 9.”

81 Id.
82 Id. ¶ 16.
83 Id.
84 Id. ¶ 19.
85 Id. ¶ 18.
86 Id. ¶ 19.
87 Id. ¶ 20.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. ¶ 21.
94 Id.
95 Id. ¶¶ 95, 97.
96 Id. ¶ 83. This concept is different from the United States’s understanding of RLUIPA.
See supra Section II.C.
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3. The Proportionality Analysis: Was this Limitation “Prescribed by Law” for a
“Legitimate Aim” and “Necessary for a Democratic Society?”
The ECtHR next determined whether those limitations had a legitimate aim
and were proportionate to their goals. First, British Airways’ image-crafting was a
97
legitimate aim. But the relative importance of the two competing interests—a
fundamental right on the one hand, and the “wish to project a certain corporate
98
image” on the other—were simple to weigh.
British Airways’ custom of
accommodating turbans and hijabs, the amendment of its uniform code, and the
discreet nature of the cross all showed that “the earlier prohibition was not of crucial
99
importance.” Thus, in Eweida’s case, the British courts’ failure to properly weigh
100
her rights against British Airways’ policy violated Article 9.
In Chaplin’s case, the ECtHR held that the state action did not violate her
101
Article 9 rights.
The interest weighed against those rights was the “health and
safety of nurses and patients,” which falls within the scope of Article 9 Section 2’s
legitimate aims and is “inherently of a greater magnitude” than British Airways’
102
interest.
Moreover, Chaplin was given a number of accommodation options,
103
although she found them insufficient.
Finally, the ECtHR noted that “hospital
managers were better placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court,
104
particularly an international court which has heard no direct evidence.”
105
Therefore, her rights were not violated.
C. S.A.S. v. France
In S.A.S. v. France, the ECtHR held that France’s burqa ban was acceptable
106
under Article 9 of the European Convention.
1. Facts and Procedural History
S.A.S. v. France involved France’s national law prohibiting anyone from
107
concealing his or her face in public.
The French government promulgated this
108
ban in response to the growing prevalence of the burqa, which was understood as
a fundamentalist, not religious, symbol that undermined France’s commitment to

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 at ¶ 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 95.
Id. ¶ 100.
Id. ¶¶ 98, 99.
Id. ¶ 98.
Id. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶ 110.
App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014).
Id. ¶ 100.
Id. ¶ 16.
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109

“liberty, equality, [and] fraternity.”
A Muslim woman brought the issue before
110
the ECtHR, claiming that the ban violated her Article 9 rights.
2. Was There an “Interference” with or “Limitation” on Religious Exercise
Rights?
The ECtHR addressed the Article 9 claim with language similar to the Supreme
Court’s in Holt v. Hobbs: “[E]ither she complies with the ban and thus refrains from
dressing in accordance to her approach to religion; or she refuses to comply and
111
faces criminal sanctions.”
The applicant neither needed “to prove that she is a
practising Muslim [n]or to show that it is her faith which obliges her to wear the full112
face veil.” The ECtHR then turned to its proportionality test to determine whether
the ban was justified.
3. The Proportionality Analysis: Was this Limitation “Prescribed by Law” for a
“Legitimate Aim” and “Necessary for a Democratic Society?”
The ECtHR evaluated France’s claims in light of the legitimate aims listed in
Article 9. France asserted two of these aims: “public safety” and “respect for the
113
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.”
The ECtHR rejected France’s arguments that banning face concealments
114
protected the safety of persons and property and prevented identity fraud.
Like
the Supreme Court in Holt v. Hobbs, the ECtHR recognized that the requirement to
“give up completely” an individual’s “manner of manifesting . . . religion or beliefs”
115
was too great a burden for this justification; France could achieve the same public
safety goals by “a mere obligation to show [one’s] face and to identify [one]self”
116
under particular circumstances.
The French government claimed that the burqa ban ensured “respect” for three
of “the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society”: “[R]espect for
equality between men and women, respect for human dignity and respect for the
117
minimum requirements of life in society.”
The ECtHR found only one to be
persuasive. The Court rejected the sex equality argument because women
118
themselves were asserting the right to wear the burqa.
France’s argument from
human dignity also failed, as the Court noted that the veil represents France’s
pluralism, adheres to certain conceptions of decency, and does not harm others’
119
human dignity.
But the ECtHR accepted that there may be “minimum

109
110
111
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120

requirements of life in society” to foster “living together.”
The Court agreed that
the inability to see one’s face harms one’s own socialization and “breach[es] the
right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together
121
easier.”
Finally, a wide margin of appreciation needed to be given to France to
122
craft its own policy to promote “living together.”
In its decision, the ECtHR gave weight to a concern that the Supreme Court
rejected under RLUIPA—the ability to practice religion in other ways. Although
“the scope of the ban is broad,” it still does not extend to “the freedom to wear in
public any garment or item of clothing—with or without a religious connotation—
123
which does not have the effect of concealing the face.”
The ban is aimed at the
124
burqa’s concealment feature, not its religious aspect. The ECtHR seemed to imply
that Muslims’ ability to wear a simple headscarf weighs in favor of France’s ban.
Hence, the burqa ban remained, even in light of Article 9’s guarantees.
IV.

HOW WOULD THE ECtHR ANALYZE HOLT V. HOBBS?

This Part will analyze the ECtHR’s hypothetical response to a Member State
that asserted the Arkansas prison’s justifications in Holt v. Hobbs. For this
hypothetical, the court of appeals would act as the court of last resort in a country
party to the European Convention and Holt would file a petition with the ECtHR.
A. Would the Prison Policy Be an “Interference” with Article 9 Rights?
The ECtHR likely would hold that the prison’s grooming policy implicates the
prisoner’s Article 9 rights because the prisoner lacks any alternatives. The ECtHR’s
guiding principle—that forcing someone to choose not to practice one aspect of his
or her faith can in itself be a limitation on his or her free exercise—is similar to
RLUIPA’s statutory provision: RLUIPA allows any burden on a sincerely held
125
religious belief to be evaluated in its own right.
Furthermore, as the ECtHR stated in S.A.S. v. France, Article 9, similar to
126
RLUIPA, is implicated even if religious exercise is not required by the religion.
The ECtHR would acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that Holt’s belief is
not “idiosyncratic.” That is similar to the United States’s rule in which a religious
127
belief need not be widely shared.
B. Would This Interference Be Proportional?
The analysis would then move to whether this interference with the Article 9
right was limited by law for a legitimate aim as necessary in a democratic society.
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Since the Arkansas prison guidelines are published online, unlike the policy
129
at issue in Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, the ECtHR’s emphasis on the margin of
appreciation would regard the regulation as “law.”
The prison’s emphasis on prison safety and prisoner identification would fall
130
131
under one of Article 9’s “legitimate aims” of “public safety.”
The ECtHR
132
would recognize “public safety” broadly but would scrutinize these claims.
It
acknowledges that certain governmental organizations are “better placed to make
133
decisions about . . . safety than a court.”
Hence, it might recognize that prisons
are better equipped to make their own judgments about prison safety.
Yet, like the Supreme Court, the ECtHR most likely would hold that the
prison’s greater expertise in running its affairs does not shield it from judgment. The
ECtHR declined to defer to France’s assertion of public safety for the burqa ban:
France’s requirement for women to “give up completely” their manifestation of
belief was disproportionate to the security aim because “a mere obligation to show
134
[one’s] face and to identify” oneself would have sufficed. In this case, the prison’s
refusal to allow Holt to wear a beard when others could wear one for dermatological
reasons probably would lead the ECtHR to reject the prison’s safety rationale, much
like the Supreme Court did. The prison’s denial of a half-inch beard likely would
be considered disproportionate for the reasons that the Supreme Court emphasized:
other prisons had adopted a less burdensome policy, and, like the French
government, the Arkansas prison was unable to articulate why such a system would
135
be insufficient.
Some factors, however, may weigh in favor of allowing the ban on longer
beards. The ECtHR could find it acceptable that the prisoner could practice his faith
in other ways, just as it indicated that the availability of the headscarf was
satisfactory in France. Also, the proportionality test allows the ECtHR to weigh
broader societal goods in Europe. As an international body, it can examine panEuropean trends to make a holistic assessment of values. The ECtHR in S.A.S. v.
France allowed the ban to be upheld on its original grounds, a fostering of
community values, which seems less compelling under United States jurisprudence.
Furthermore, while an individual may be able to move to a country more welcoming
of his or her religious expression, prisoners lack choice; if the prison harms their
religious rights, they cannot remedy the situation.
The ECtHR’s deep scrutiny of the public safety justification, in light of the
ECtHR’s ultimate holding in favor of the burqa ban, seems to be a mere warning to
other Member States about the limits of safety rationales. Because the ECtHR
recognizes a legitimate margin of appreciation, it may be more willing to assess
128 See
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DEP’T
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(2015),
http://adc.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/inmate_handbook.pdf.
129 See Ukraine, App. No. 38812/97, ¶ 158 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003).
130 S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11 at ¶ 111.
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132 See S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11 at ¶¶ 115, 139; see also Eweida v. United Kingdom, Apps.
No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10, ¶ 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013).
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concerns of safety, which seem more empirical, than problems of culture and
tradition. Questions about public safety have a sort of uniformity across Western
jurisdictions, while questions of culture are more varied. A country can promote its
culture more broadly but should not attempt to obscure these cultural decisions under
the guise of public safety.
Relatedly, the ECtHR seems to recognize that a State can protect culture
through fairly coercive means without violating the European Convention. Social
cohesion remains a driving consideration at the ECtHR even in the face of religious
liberty concerns. In Holt’s case, then, the ECtHR might be more willing to accept
the prison’s argument if it included fostering internal community and equality of
treatment, rather than public safety. The ECtHR seems to recognize an interest in
similar treatment to create social harmony in a way RLUIPA does not permit. With
these considerations, the European Court could rule in favor of the prison.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing exercise shows the differences between the ECtHR’s Article 9
proportionality balancing test and RLUIPA’s burden-shifting framework. The
Article 9 test seems distinctly European, with its emphasis on proportionality and
the margin of appreciation. The ECtHR’s position as an international organization
causes it to defer to national decisions and acknowledge the diversity of European
States. It refrains from creating easily applicable factor tests, as these tests would
overstep the ECtHR’s role as an international protector of rights.
The Supreme Court’s test has the hallmarks of the American common law and
statutory system: a multipart test, fact-intensive analysis, and fairly bright lines. The
Supreme Court has the authority to issue definitive opinions on statutory
interpretation to create uniform rules throughout the United States. A clear
command from the Supreme Court limits the amount of discretion—and therefore
power—that lower courts have. The proportionality test’s very benefit in the
European system of providing deference to domestic courts, letting them retain some
power over their own affairs, could be a detriment to the Supreme Court’s goal of
equal application of laws. Yet, even with these interpretive and factual distinctions,
this case likely is fairly easy for both Courts. Currently, there seems to be a harmony
between the European and American regimes in result, even if not in the
fundamentality of this right.
The margin of appreciation doctrine thus gives the ECtHR the flexibility to
defer more in the future to a country’s own determinations about its own interests.
Although the ECtHR’s existence is partially to remove questions of rights protection
from political contingencies, the margin of appreciation allows it to dialogue with
its Member States and provide greater room for local policy decisions while still
being fairly insulated from political pressures. And, since it knows no stare decisis,
its caselaw can fluctuate rather easily between extremes, and it can reshape its policy
of adjudication in accordance with its “living instrument” doctrine.
Finally, the constitutional-statutory distinction shows the values of the
communities at large. RLUIPA is a concession for religious believers. Congress
has made a policy judgment that protection of religious belief is worthwhile even in
the face of other neutral laws. In the State parties to the ECtHR, the religious right
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is constitutionally fundamental and supplants domestic jurisdictions’ own
determinations and policy judgments.
Issues of religious liberty will continue to present themselves in both
jurisdictions. Further, the utility of proportionality-style tests in American
jurisprudence will remain a live issue for years to come. It remains to be seen
whether this apparent convergence is a sign of a larger unity or just one point of
similarity in otherwise disparate approaches.

